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Then there are axioms (everyone maximizes his profits; resource allo-
cation is the only economic problem): these are not known in other
sciences. An axiom . . . is only a premise one is not allowed to ques-
tion, dressed up as something grand. But it is precisely the scientists
duty to question everything! Our crime is not that we use a priori
reasoning, for often we can use nothing else, but that we push the a
priori all the way up to the axiom. "Axiom" is, of course, a polite
but impressive-sounding word for a "sacred proposition." The concept
gives us the impression that it is worthwhile to erect vast superstruc-
tures of deduction on virtually no fact, and this has now become a
deep-rooted tradition. . . . These, then (abstractions, parsimony, ax-
ioms, economic determinacy) surely are the "Ricardian Vices" to which
we are all heirs; it is these that divert and corrupt our energies. (Wiles,
1979, pp. 163-164), original emphasis
Among plenty of wish-wash this is a definite answer to the question: What went
wrong with economics? and, above all, to: Who is to blame? But rounding up
the culprit does not put an end to all issues: How was it done and how could it
happen that this evil spirit, Ricardo, ‘conquered England as completely as the Holy
Inquisition conquered Spain’ (Keynes, quoted in Deane, 1978, p. 75)?
On the other hand, if economics is essentially an engine of analysis, a
method of thinking rather than a body of substantive results, Ricardo
literally invented the technique of economics. . . . His gift for heroic
abstractions produced one of the most impressive models, judged by
its scope and practical import, in the entire history of economic theory:
seizing hold of a wide range of significant problems with a simple
analytical model involving only a few strategic variables, he produced
dramatic conclusions oriented to policy action. In short he was the
first to master that art that brought success to Keynes in our own day.
Not everyone will consider this praiseworthy. Even Schumpeter calls
Ricardo’s habit of applying severely simplified abstractions to the solu-
tion of practical problems ‘the Ricardian Vice’. And to the Historical
School and the American Institutionalists, Ricardo has always stood
for everything they detest in orthodox economics. (Blaug, 1998, p.
132-133)
Neither the Historical School, nor the American Institutionalist, nor their modern
heterodox incarnations, though, ever came up with a convincing alternative. Wedded
to plane empiricism, the inductive method and Verstehen, they got lost in the ever
changing tides of surface phenomena. Insisting on the stale polarity of realism vs.
abstraction this could not be otherwise.
Since, therefore, it is vain to hope that truth can be arrived at, either
in Political Economy or in any other department of the social science,
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while we look at the facts in the concrete, clothed in all the complexity
with which nature has surrounded them, and endeavour to elicit a
general law by a process of induction from a comparison of details;
there remains no other method than the à priori one, or that of “abstract
speculation.” (Mill, 2004, pp. 113-114)
With abstract speculation Mill meant the axiomatic method.
In political economy, Ricardo and James Mill compared the certainty of
the propositions they were advancing to the certainty of the propositions
of Euclid. (Halévy, 1960, p. 494)
Touching the nerve of methodology this claim was vigorously contested from the
very first moment on two essentially different counts:
A remarkable discussion has been lately going on in the revues and
journals concerning the logical method of the science, touching even the
question whether there exists such a science at all. Attention was drawn
to the matter by Mr. T. E. Cliffe Leslie’s remarkable article “On the
Philosophical Method of Political Economy,” in which he endeavours
to dissipate the deductive science of Ricardo. Mr. W. T. Thornton’s
writings have a somewhat similar tendency. . . . Many would be glad
if the supposed science collapsed altogether, and became a matter of
history, like astrology, alchemy, and the occult sciences generally. . . .
But as regards the fate of the deductive method, I disagree altogether
with my friend Mr. Leslie; he is in favor of simple deletion; I am for
thorough reform and reconstruction. (Jevons, 1911, pp. xv-xvi)
Jevons’s reconstruction was taken up and elaborated on by Walras – with scant
success:
Walras approached Poincaré for his approval. . . . But Poincaré was
devoutly committed to applied mathematics and did not fail to notice
that utility is a nonmeasurable magnitude. . . . He also wondered about
the premises of Walras’s mathematics: It might be reasonable, as a
first approximation, to regard men as completely self-interested, but
the assumption of perfect foreknowledge “perhaps requires a certain
reserve.” (Porter, 1994, p. 154)
There have always been two answers to the Ricardian challenge: (a) the whole
method is mistaken, and (b), there is nothing wrong with the method, but the
foundational assumptions concerning the working of the economy are beside the
point, that is, axiomatization is right but the axioms are wrong.1
1 To be sure, the emotional uproar is not solely about methodology. For the socio-political background
of the ‘Malthus-Ricardo embroilment’ see (Kanth, 1992, pp. 108-113)
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We should also like to underline Debreu’s effective reference to Bacon
when he says that “citius emergit veritas ex errore quam ex confusione.”
It would be a mistake to lower the level of analysis and clarification.
The only way possible is a thorough reexamination of the theory’s
basic hypotheses, i.e., a true paradigmatic revolution. (Ingrao and
Israel, 1990, p. 362) original emphasis
Each theory, orthodox and heterodox in equal measure, starts from a small set of
foundational ‘hypotheses or axioms or postulates or assumptions or even principles’
(Schumpeter, 1994, p. 15). Standard economics rests on a set of behavioral axioms
(Arrow and Hahn, 1991, p. v). The main thesis of the present paper is that human
behavior does not yield to the axiomatic method, yet the axiomatization of the money
economy’s fundamental structure is feasible. The crucial point is not axiomatization
per se but the real world content of axioms. Our objective is to make the implications
of the structural axiom set about profit and rent explicit and to contrast them with
Ricardo’s approach in order to settle a time-honored methodological question.
By choosing objective structural relationships as axioms behavioral hypotheses
are not ruled out. On the contrary, the structural axiom set is open to any behavioral
assumption and not restricted to the standard optimization calculus.
We proceed as follows. The minimalistic formal frame that constitutes the pure
consumption economy is set up in section 1. In section 2 the Ricardian and the
structural axiomatic concepts of profit are contrasted. The consistent interrelation
of the real and the monetary sphere is formally established in section 3. The
differentiation between the ownership of the firm and the ownership of land is
carried out in section 4 and it is shown how it gives rise to a redistribution of profits
within the business sector. In section 5 the lease price is determined under the
condition of profit ratio equalization. Section 6 concludes.
1 Axioms
The first three structural axioms relate to income, production, and expenditures in
a period of arbitrary length. For the remainder of this inquiry the period length is
conveniently assumed to be the calendar year. Simplicity demands that we have at
first one world economy, one firm, and one product.
Total income of the household sector Y is the sum of wage income, i.e. the
product of wage rate W and working hours L, and distributed profit, i.e. the product
of dividend D and the number of shares N.
Y =WL+DN |t (1)
Output of the business sector O is the product of productivity R and working
hours.
O = RL |t (2)
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Consumption expenditures C of the household sector is the product of price P
and quantity bought X.
C = PX |t (3)
The axioms represent the pure consumption economy, that is, no investment
expenditures, no foreign trade, and no taxes or any other government activity.
2 Profit
The task, as defined by Ricardo, is: ‘To determine the laws which regulate this
distribution [of profits, rents and wages], is the principal problem in Political
Economy’.
2.1 Structural axiomatic profit
The business sector’s financial profit in period t is defined with (4) as the difference
between the sales revenues – for the economy as a whole identical with consumption
expenditures C – and costs – here identical with wage income YW:
Q f i ≡C−YW |t (4)
In explicit form, after the substitution of (3), this definition is identical with that
of the theory of the firm:
Q f i ≡ PX−WL ⇐ YW ≡WL |t (5)
With (6) the expenditure ratio rE, the sales ratio rX, the distributed profit ratio
rD is added for formal convenience as:
ρE ≡ CY ρX ≡
X
O
ρD ≡ YDYW ⇐ YD ≡ DN |t (6)
Definitions add no new content to the set of axioms but determine the logical
context of concepts (Stigum, 1991, pp. 35-36). An expenditure ratio rE =1 indicates
that total consumption expenditures are equal to total income, or, in other words,
that the household sector’s budget is balanced; a value of rX =1 of the sales ratio
means that the quantities produced and sold are equal in period t or, in other words,
that the product market is cleared.
Using the first axiom (1) in combination with (6) one gets from (4) the relation
between financial profit and the key ratios:
Q f i ≡C−Y +YD ⇒ Q f i ≡
(
ρE − 11+ρD
)
Y cond. ρX = 1 |t (7)
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In the pure consumption economy financial profit is greater than zero if the
expenditure ratio rE is >1 or the distributed profit ratio rD is >0, or both. If
distributed profit YD is set to zero, then profit or loss of the business sector is
determined solely by the expenditure ratio. For the business sector as a whole to
make a profit consumption expenditures C have in the simplest case to be greater
than wage income YW. So that profit comes into existence in the pure consumption
economy the household sector must run a deficit at least in one period. This in turn
makes the inclusion of the financial sector mandatory (see 2011).
To get rid of all absolute magnitudes the profit ratio rQ is defined with (8) and
this gives a succinct summary of the structural interrelation of the profit ratio, the
expenditure ratio, and the distributed profit ratio for the business sector as a whole:
ρQ ≡ ρE (1+ρD)−1 ⇐ ρQ ≡ Q f iYW |t (8)
The overall profit ratio is positive if the expenditure ratio rE is >1 or the
distributed profit ratio rD is >0, or both.
The determinants of profit look essentially different depending on the perspec-
tive. For the firm price P, quantity X, wage rate W, and employment L in (5) seem
to be all important; under the broader perspective of (7) these variables play no role
at all. Both views are formally equivalent,
2.2 Ricardo’s wheat profit
The first thing to note is that Ricardo left nominal values and money completely
out of the picture. This abstraction together with the assumption of decreasing
returns on the combined input of labor and capital without further ado delivers the
distribution of the period output of wheat:
The difference between the net wheat product per worker on the least
fertile land and the constant wheat wage per worker goes to the tenant
farmer as profit. Owing to the action of competition, the advantages
of working superior land go entirely to the landowner in the form of
ever increasing rents. As more land is is taken up, the net produce
per worker falls whereas the real wage remains the same. Obviously,
profits per worker decline. (Blaug, 1998, p. 88)
From this class-struggle follows quite naturally:
Further, Ricardo discussed at considerable length the tension between
the workers and the capitalists, in that he claimed consistently that the
rate of wages and the rate of profit varied inversely. His proposition
at the beginning of his chapter “On Profits” that “profits would be
high or low in proportion as wages were low or high” . . . came back
repeatedly to prominence. (Vickers, 1995, p. 62), see also (Nadal,
2004, pp. 193-197)
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P=1 L R O W YW C
A 10 3 30 3 30 30
B 10 2 20 2 20 20
C 10 1 10 1 10 10
S 60 60 60
(a) Real and nominal sphere of the initial economy
L R O W YW C D
10 3 30 2 20 30 10
10 2 20 2 20 20 0
10 1 10 2 20 10 -10
60 60 60 0
(b) Applying a uniform wage rate
Table 1: The emergence of profit and loss
Schumpeter held that Ricardian analysis was a detour, yet credited him with the
invention of a powerful engine of analysis: ‘a systematic performance of the first or-
der’ (1994, p. 474). The main element of this engine was decreasing returns. Hence
Ricardo cannot be accused of unrealistic abstraction. To the contrary, decreasing
returns seem to be one of the plainest facts in economics. With this parochial realism
– what could be more real than a wheat profit? – Ricardo was instrumental in the
‘victory of real analysis over monetary analysis’:
By ‘monetary analysis’, we mean any analysis that introduces the
element of money at the outset of the argument and denies that the
essential features of economic life can be expresses by a barter model.
By ‘real analysis’ we mean analysis that explains economic activity
solely in terms of decisions about goods and services and the relation
between them; . . . (Blaug, 1998, pp. 22-23)
The structural axiomatic approach integrates real and monetary analysis.
3 From the initial state to the money economy
In order to elucidate the tacit assumptions of Ricardo’s analysis we first go back to
the initial state as the elementary and most transparent point of departure. Thereby
we follow Ricardo in furthering the argument with a numerical example that, of
course, is just a concretization of the structural axiom set. The starting point is given
with Table 1a.
We have three agents, the farmers A, B, C, which cultivate three parcels of land
of perfectly equal size but with different productivities R and correspondingly with
different outputs O per period t, given an equal labor input L of 10 units. The left
part of Table 1a shows the real sphere. Since each agent consumes his own output
real consumption differs markedly. ‘The produce of the earth’ (Ricardo, 1981, p.
5) is divided among three autarkic farmers. Workers, capitalists and landlords are
absent. The unequal real distribution is due to the given productivity differentials.
Without any real change, the self-sufficient farmers become now economically
literate, i.e. they start to calculate in nominal terms as shown in the right part of
Table 1b. At first the wage rates W are set in exact proportion to productivities R.
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From this follows the distribution of wage incomes YW. The individual consump-
tion expenditures are equal to the individual wage incomes. These consumption
expenditures ‘buy’ the respective outputs at the price P=1. There are no market
transactions and there is no money in the initial economy. Money is only present as
a unit of account.
By comparing their calculations the farmers realize that they arrive at an equal
price for their qualitatively identical outputs but that their wage rates are different.
Since their labor input is qualitatively identical, different wage rates seem to be
unjustified, and they decide to impute the same wage rate W=2 to their calculations.
The result is shown in the right part of Table 1b.
Farmer A realizes that his wage income falls from 30 to 20 units when he regards
himself as a household. Yet when he regards himself as a firm he now makes a profit
of 10 units. Taking both components together, his situation is unchanged in nominal
as well as in real terms. The same is true for farmer C who now gets a higher wage
income but makes a loss when he regards himself as a firm. After equalizing the
wage rates the different productivities reappear as the nominal magnitudes profit
and loss. These new phenomena are a consequence of the equalization of wage
rates, that is, of the application of the ‘law of one price’ and of the fact that wage
incomes and consumption expenditures are no longer equal for each farmer. Farmer
A dissaves and farmer C saves. It deserves mention that all these new phenomena
emerge uno actu and have no counterpart whatsoever in the real part of the economy.
From this follows that it cannot be taken for granted that the concepts of profit or
saving are actually applicable to the real part of the economy. In fact, as Knight
already recognized, this back projection is methodologically inadmissible:
In an "exchange" economy, where individuals (families) secured their
livelihood by the production and exchange of products . . . , the cate-
gories of rent, wages, interest, and profits would have no existence.
(Knight, 1935, p. 7)
Using the terms profit and rent in a real model is the Ricardian Vice as seen from
the structural axiomatic position.
Up to this point profit and loss exist only in the minds of the calculating agents.
Their real situation is the same as in the initial state. To make profit and loss real we
have to split the initial economy into the household and the business sector. The
households receive income and divide it between consumption expenditures and
saving. They do nothing else. All economic activities take place in the business
sector. As with Walras ‘The economic system is made up of households and firms.’
(Arrow and Hahn, 1991, p. 3). Analytical clarity demands that the multiple roles
of the autarkic farmers are differentiated. Accordingly the farmers become at first
owners of their firms and hire themselves as workers. In this role they receive wage
income. The profit accrues to the firm (Ellerman, 1986). The owner of the firm in
the last instance decides whether profit goes in the form of distributed profit to the
household sector or else remains as retained profit in the business sector. In Table
1b firm A distributes 10 units to the household sector. Distributed profit is here equal
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P=2 L R O W YW C Q YD Y
A 10 3 30 2 20 60 40 40 60
B 10 2 20 2 20 40 20 20 40
C 10 1 10 2 20 20 0 0 20
S 60 60 120 60 60 120
Table 2: Real and nominal spheres of the structural axiomatic economy
to profit. This is obviously a limiting case. In the real world profit and distributed
profit are never equal. A loss first hits the firm, but in the last instance the owner has
to balance it (with details depending on the legal definition of ownership). This is
the case of firm C. Profit and loss sum up to zero for the business sector as a whole.
Dissaving and saving sum up to zero for the household sector as a whole.
Full differentiation requires that the firm hires the workers. Uno actu with
the analytical splitting of the economy into the household and the business sector
both the labor and the product market come into being and this entails money as a
transaction medium. It is assumed that transaction money is provided by the central
bank (see 2011).
Since firm C makes a loss the situation is not stable in the longer run. To
establish structural stability it is necessary that the profit is at least zero in the
marginal firm. This can be achieved by raising the price from P=1 to P=2 as shown
in Table 2.
To buy the unchanged quantities each agent now has to double consumption
expenditures as shown in the C-column. The result is that firms A and B make a
profit Q while the marginal firm breaks even. These profits are fully distributed.
The household sector’s income Y consists of wage income YW and distributed profit
income YD according to the 1st axiom (1). Total income is equal to consumption
expenditures, that is, the expenditure ratio rE is unity. The distributed profit ratio
rD is >0. Profit is equal to distributed profit. The real part of the economy has not
changed a iota. We have formally transformed the initial state into a stable money
economy without any change in labor input, productivity, and real consumption. In
both the product and the labor market the ‘law of one price’ holds.
Securing the existence of the marginal firm entails a change of the distribution
of output. Wage earners absorb at the new price 30 units, the other 30 units go to
the receivers of distributed profits under the condition that both groups spend their
whole income. Seen from our new vantage point the erstwhile autarkic farmers’s
real income was not plainly 30, 20, 10 but consisted of the real wage incomes 10,
10, 10 and the real distributed profits 20, 10, 0. The latter are the nominal images
of the real productivity differentials. Without knowing it the farmers made profits
in the initial economy and distributed them to themselves. This becomes perfectly
clear when we change the initial conditions and assume that the productivities are
equal on all parcels of land. The result is shown in Table 3.
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P=1 L R O W YW C Q YD Y
A 10 2 20 2 20 20 0 0 20
B 10 2 20 2 20 20 0 0 20
C 10 2 20 2 20 20 0 0 20
S 60 60 60 0 0 60
Table 3: Real and nominal spheres with equal productivities
In the new structure the price is P=1 and all profits and distributed profits vanish.
The real wage incomes are now 20, 20, 20, that is, they double in comparison to
Table 2. The real wage does not depend on the effort of the workers, which is the
same in all cases, but on the productivity differentials among firms. The same is
true for profit and distributed profit. Their raison d’être is in the last instance to keep
the marginal firm in the market and to maintain the given structure. This structural
fact has, of course, some repercussions for the notion of a factor of production.
From the axioms (1) to (3) and definitions (6) follows the price as dependent
variable:
P =
ρE
ρX
(1+ρD)
W
R
|t (9)
Under the condition of market clearing rX=1 and budget balancing rE=1 the
price is determined by the distributed profit ratio and unit wage costs:
P∗ = (1+ρD)
W
R
if ρX = 1; ρE = 1 |t (10)
For a wage rate W=2, an average productivity R=2, and a distributed profit ratio
rD=1 the market clearing price is P*=2. From (10) follows the real wage:
W
P∗
=
R
1+ρD
if ρX = 1; ρE = 1 |t (11)
The real wage is W/P*=1 if the distributed profit ratio is unity as in Table 2.
Since the labor input is 10 units the wage income recipients absorb in total 30 units
of output. The other half is absorbed by the recipients of distributed profit income.
The real wage is W/P*=2 if the the distributed profit ratio is zero as in Table 3.
The wage income recipients absorb the whole output. In the last instance the real
wage depends on the productivity differentials among firms and the ‘law of one
price’ in the labor market. The real wage is not determined in the labor market or
in the sphere of production but by the structural interaction of real and nominal
variables. The real wage is not fixed, as Ricardo maintained, by some physical
or social minimum, or, for that matter, by the marginal product of a conveniently
chosen production function. The real economy is not the real economy, the money
economy is the real economy.
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P=2 L R O W YAW PD XD C QA PD XD YDW QD YDD Y
A 10 3 30 2 20 40 60 0 40 0 40 40 60
B 10 2 20 2 20 20 40 0 20 0 20 20 40
C 10 1 10 2 20 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 20
S 60 60 60 120 0 60 60 60 120
Table 4: Redistribution of profits between the consumption good producing firms and the land owning
firm
4 The redistribution of profit
For the initial economy we have left open the question of whether the farmers own
their land parcels or not. We now have to carry the analytical differentiation one step
further and to discriminate between the ownership of the firm and the ownership of
land. Therefore an additional firm is introduced that owns the land.
A private person that offers land for commercial use is no longer a private person
but a firm. Each economically relevant activity takes place in a separate firm and
all firms together form the business sector. This analytical separation is essential.
It makes it possible to abstract from historical peculiarities and to treat agrarian
and industrial production alike. The household sector provides the labor input and
absorbs the final output. As shareholders the households receive in addition to wage
income the distributed profit income.
To begin with it is assumed that all available land is owned by firm D. The
output of firm D consists of land services that are bought by firm A, B, C. Being
not storable, there can be no difference between services produced O and services
bought X, hence OD=XD. Firm D sells a quantity X of land services at a leasing
price P to each firm. The profit of the land owning firm follows from (5) as:
Q f iD ≡ PDA XDA +PDB XDB +PDC XDC−WDLD (12)
Firm A pays for the land services, therefore its profit equation changes from (5)
to:
Q f iA = PAXA−PDA XDA−WALA (13)
Likewise for the other firms. It is assumed now at first that firm D as land owner
fixes a lease price for each firm such that the profits of firms A and B vanish and are
completely transferred to firm D. This does not alter the profit of the business sector
as a whole. When (12) and (13) are summed up the lease payments PDAXDA always
cancel out. Profit and full profit distribution now reappear in firm D as shown in
Table 4. To forestall second round effects the wage costs of firm D, i.e. YDW, have
been here set to zero. Hence total income Y and consumption expenditures C do not
change compared to Table 2. The owners of firm A and B ‘loose’ the owners of firm
D ‘gain’ but total profits remain unchanged and the wage income recipients are not
affected.
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Based on the ownership of land firm D governs via the lease price to some
extent the distribution of profits within the business sector. The crucial factor for
the distribution of output is productivity differentials in combination with the ‘law
of one price’, which, of course, is not a law in the proper sense.
There is no need to invent a new income category and to call the distributed
profits of firm D rent. The two categories wage income and distributed profit
suffice. By ignoring the monetary side of the economy Ricardo could not see
that what appears as a factor remuneration is actually profit redistribution. On the
theoretical level rent is not a separate income category but just another manifestation
of distributed profit. By analytically separating the production of land services from
the personal ownership of land the former landlord now becomes the owner of firm
D and receives distributed profits as income.
5 The pricing of land services
From (12) and (13) follows that the distribution of profits between firms A and D
depends on the lease price PD if all input quantities and the wage rates are given for
the period under consideration.
Firm A faces the following situation. The productivity RA of the parcel of land
which it has leased from firm D is given and known as a rough average. All other
available sites have a lower productivity – again on the average. The productivity
differential is expressed by a productivity factor t<1. Therefore, if firm A moves to
another site its profit will be lower. Equation (5) changes to:
Q f iA ≡ PAτRALA−WALA ⇐ τ < 1 |t (14)
On the other hand, firm A has current leasing costs per period of PDXD which
lower its profit:
Q f iA ≡ PARALA−PDXD−WALA if ρXA = 1 |t (15)
The lease price PD can be rewritten as the product of the lease price factor y
and the minimum lease price PD0. At this price firm D’s profit is zero.
Q f iA ≡ PARALA−ψ PD0 XD−WALA ⇐ PD0 = WDRD |t (16)
The diverse qualities of land open the opportunity to raise the minimum lease
price PD0 by a factor y for the site currently used by firm A. The relation between
the productivity factor t and the maximum lease price factor y can be derived from
(14)=(16) and is given by:
ψmax ≡ (1− τ) PA
PD0
RA
RD
LA
LD︸ ︷︷ ︸
structural ratios
|t (17)
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The lease price factor y is always positive and >1. The margin for negotiation
is then given by PD0 as lower boundary and ymaxPD0 as upper boundary. At a higher
lease price it is advantageous for firm A to move to another site. Within these
objectively given boundaries firm D is in the position to influence the distribution
of profits. It deserves mention that it is virtually impossible for firm D to know the
actual parameter values of (17), notwithstanding the fact that they are measurable
in principle. The exact margin for negotiation is shrouded in mist and no behavioral
theory is capable of predicting the final outcome.
In order to eliminate all subjective elements and to determine the lease price
objectively an additional assumption is required. We demand that the profit ratios
of firms A and D shall be equal. The respective profit ratios follow from (8):
ρQA ≡ Q f iAWALA ρQD ≡
Q f iD
WALD
|t (18)
Substituting (15) gives for firm A:
ρQA ≡ PARAWA −
PDRDLD
WALA
−1 if ρXA = 1 |t (19)
Applying (5) to firm D gives:
ρQD ≡ PDRDWD −1 if ρXD = 1 |t (20)
From the equalization of profit ratios (19)=(20) then follows the lease price:
PD = PA
RA
RD
WA
WD
+
LD
LA︸ ︷︷ ︸
structural ratios
|t (21)
The lease price depends on the price of the final product PA and an array of
structural ratios. By substituting the structural ratios from (17) one gets alternatively
the lease price factor in dependence from the maximum lease price factor and the
productivity factor:
ψ =
ψmax
1− τ
WALA
WDLD
+1
|t (22)
Under the condition of equal profit ratios for both firm A and D the lease price
factor is less than the maximum lease price factor. The factor is the higher the lower
the productivity on the available other sites is. One is tempted to characterize this
as a fair lease price factor.
What remains to be determined is the price for the final product. From the axiom
set and (6) follows under the condition of market clearing and budget balancing
analogous to (10) for two firms:
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P
∗
A = (1+ρD)
W
RA
L
LA
if ρX = 1; ρE = 1 |t
L≡ LA +LD W ≡ 1L (WALA +WDLD)
(23)
The price of the consumption good depends in the main on the distributed profit
ratio and unit wage costs. From this price the lease price is derived according to (21)
under the condition of equal profit ratios. As a consequence the economic fate of
the land owning firm ultimately hinges also on the conditions in the product market.
The lease price, and with it the profit of firm D, moves with the product price.
A separate factor income rent does not exist. The land owning firm makes a
profit (or loss, as the case may be) just like any other firm. Between the owners of
the consumption good producing firm and the owners of the land services producing
firm is not much difference. Capitalist and landlord are colorful figures; good for
storytelling but without noticeable analytical value.
Standard economics is broadly, yet with great variations in detail, structured by
the underlying classification of the factors of production labor, land, capital, and
entrepreneurship on the one hand and the income categories wage, rent, interest,
and profit on the other. Thus income can be treated as the reward for the productive
contribution of each factor to the final output. This intuitively appealing classifica-
tory scheme is not without problems, to say the least, but ‘perhaps the main ground
for the reluctance of economists to discard it is æsthetic’ (Fraser, 1937, p. 217).
Whether the main ground is æsthecic or apologetic is a matter of indifference with
regard to the crucial methodological point.
The compelling reason for the rejection of this misleading conceptual framework
is that profit is not a factor income. According to the 1st axiom income consists of
wage income and distributed profit. The distinction between distributed profit as
income and profit as factor independent residual is crucial. Models that are based
on the collapsed definition income≡wages+profits are a priori false because profit
and distributed profit is not the same thing. Rent, in any case, is neither a factor
remuneration nor a separate income category. Ricardo failed to pierce through the
historical surface. His theory of distribution is realistic but false. The marginalistic
theory of distribution is not an improvement; it lacks even parochial realism.
6 Conclusions
Ricardo literally invented the technique of economics. This, and not the concrete
results of his analysis, makes him a key figure in the history of economic thought.
Ricardo was instrumental in the ‘victory of real analysis over monetary analysis’
thereby dichotomizing the subject matter of economics. Standard economics has
not recovered from this victory.
The structural axiomatic approach enables a consistent real and monetary analy-
sis. The main results are:
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• Profit is not a factor income. The distinction between distributed profit as
income and profit as factor independent residual is crucial.
• Rent is neither a factor remuneration nor a separate income category.
• By ignoring the monetary side of the economy Ricardo could not see that
what appears as a factor remuneration is actually profit redistribution. Rent is
just another manifestation of distributed profit.
• Models that are based on the collapsed definition income≡wages+profits are
a priori false because profit and distributed profit is not the same thing.
• Under the condition of profit ratio equalization the lease price depends on the
price of the final product and an array of objective structural ratios.
The often cited Ricardian Vice does not consist in heroic abstraction but rather in a
herostratic abstraction from the monetary sphere.
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